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Editor's note: Over the years, critics of the
exclusionary rule have called it, among other
things, an "illogical," "irrational,"and "unnatural" interpretation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Last fall, for example, U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Malcolm Wilkey, writing in the
Wall Street Journal, said the rule "is not
The exclurequiredby the Constitution....
sionary rule is a judge-made rule of evidence
which bars 'the use of evidence secured
through an illegal search and seizure.'...
The only excuse offered for this irrational
rule is that there is 'no effective alternative'
to make the police obey the law."
In an effort to explore this controversial
question further, Judicature invited Judge
Wilkey and a defender of the rule, Yale
Kamisar, to express their views. Judge Wilkey will explain his opposition and suggest
alternatives to the rule in a later issue.

These justices were engaged in a less
ambitious venture, albeit a most important
one. They were interpreting the Fourth
Amendment as best they could. As they saw
it, the rule-now known as the federal exclusionary rule-rested on "a principled basis
5
rather than an empirical proposition."
The dissenters in United States v. Calandra were, I think, plainly right when they
maintained that "uppermost in the minds of
the framers of the [exclusionary] rule" was
not "the rule's possible deterrent effect," but
"the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to
avoid the taint of partnership in official
lawlessness and of assuring the people [that]
the government would not profit from its
lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk
of seriously undermining popular trust in
government.''6 The main purpose of this
article, then, is to trace, explain and justify
the original grounding of the exclusionary
rule-what has come to be known as "the
imperative of judicial intergrity.
"7

M

ore than 50 years have passed since
the Supreme Court decided the Weeks
case,' barring the use in federal prosecutions
of evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, and the Silverthorne
case,2 invoking what has come to be known
as the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.3 The justices who decided those cases
would, I think, be quite surprised to learn
that some day the value of the exclusionary
rule would be measured by-and the very
life of the rule might depend on-an empirical evaluation of its efficacy in deterring
4
police misconduct.
1. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2.: Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920)
3. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939),
refusing to allow the prosecution to avoid an inquiry
into its use of information gained by illegal wiretapping, first used the phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree."
See generally Pitler, 'The Fruit of the Poisonous Tred
Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 579
(1968).
4. Space does not permit an extensive evaluation of
the recent "empirical studies" of the exclusionary rule's
effects (if any) on police behavior. But see "Does the
exclusionary rule affect police behavior?" on page 70 of
this issue.

The Weeks opinion
As Professor Francis Allen recently reminded us, the Weeks opinion "contains no language that expressly justifies the rule by
reference to a supposed deterrent effect on
5. Cf. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice:
The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U.
ILL.L.F. 518, 536-37 (pointing out that, unlike the
Court's understanding in the formative phases of the
exclusionary rule's history, in recent years the deterrent
function has prevailed as its predominant justification,
and that "until the rule rests on [returns to?] a principled basis rather than an empirical proposition," Mapp
"will remain in a state of unstable equilibrium").
6. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 388, 357
(1974) (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas and Marshall,
JJ., dissenting). Calandraheld that a grand jury witness
may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that
they are based on evidence obtained from him by
violating the Fourth Amendment. See also, Schrock and
Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a
Constitutional Requiremen4 59 MINN. L. REV. 251

(1974).
7. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)
(Stewart, J.) (overturning the "silver platter" doctrine),
quoted with approval in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
656 (1961) (Clark, J.) (imposing the exclusionary rule as
to unconstitutionally seized materials on state courts as
a matter of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process). See
also United States v. Calandra, supra n. 6.
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police officials."" Indeed, in the United
States Supreme Court, some 35 years were to
pass, as Professor Robert McKay has noted,
before Wolf v. Coloradoa "introduced the
notion of deterrence of official illegality to
the debate concerning the wisdom of the
exclusionary rule."o
As the Weeks justices saw it, if a court
could not "sanction" a search or seizure
before the event-because, for example, the
police lacked sufficient cause to make the
search or were unable to describe the item(s)
they sought with the requisite particularity-then a court could not, or at least should
not, "affirm" or "sanction" the search or
seizure after the event.
The courts, after all, are the specific addressees of the constitutional command that
"no Warrants shall issue, but upon" certain
prescribed conditions. If "not even an order
of court would have justified" the police
action, as it would not have had in Weeks,
then "much less was it within [the officers']
authority" to proceed on their own "to bring
further proof [of guilt] to' the aid of the
Government." And if the government's
agents did proceed on their own, "without
sanction of law," then the government
should not be permitted to use what their
agents obtained. The government whose
agents violated the Constitution should be
in no better position than the government
whose agents obeyed it; "the efforts of the
courts and their officials to bring the guilty
to punishment ... are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of [Fourth Amendment] principles." Is any of this really so hard to follow?
Since so many commentators lately have
emphasized the efficacy (or inefficacy) of the
exclusionary rule in preventing illegal
searches and seizures," it may be profitable
to take a fresh look at the key passages in the
old Weeks case:
...The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws [to] obtain convictions by means of
unlawful seizures ...should find no sanction in
8. Id. at 536 n. 90.
9. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled, Mapp v. Ohio, 367

U.S. 643 (1961).

10. McKay, Mapp v. Ohio, The Exclusionary Rule
and the Right of Privacy, 15 ARIzoNA L. REV. 327, 330

(1973).
11. See notes 5, 6 and 7 supra.

68

the judgments of the courts which are charged at
all times with the support of the Constitution and
to which people of all conditions have a right to
appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental
rights.
...The efforts of the courts and their officials
to bring the guilty to punishment

. . .

are not to

be aided by the sacrifice of [Fourth Amendment]
principles .... The United States Marshall acted
without sanction of law . . .and under color of

his office undertook to make a seizure of private
papers in direct violation of the constitutional
prohibition against such action .... To sanction

such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial
decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution,
intended for the protection1 2 of the people against
such unauthorized action.
Ratifying illegal searches
Although the Fourth Amendment constitutes a guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures, it does not, of course,
explicitly state what the consequences of a
violation of the guarantee should be. This
"specific" of the Bill of Rights turns
out, as
is so often the case,' 3 not to be specific about
the issue which confronted the Weeks Court
and is the subject of today's debate.
This only means that here as elsewherealmost everywhere-the Court "cannot escape the demands of judging or of making
...difficult appraisals."' 14 But what is
wrong with the Weeks Court's appraisal?
Does its reading of the Fourth Amendment
do violence to the language or purpose of the
guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure? Does its interpretation of this constitutional provision require an active imagination? Is the interpretation strained, illogical or implausible?
It is plain that Holmes and Brandeis
thought not. In the Silverthome case,
Holmes, joined by Brandeis and five other
justices, observed:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not
12. 232 U.S. at 392-94.
13. See, e.g., Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code
of Criminal Procedure,53 CALIF. L. REV. 929,937,954
(1965); Kadish, Methodology and Criteriain Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE

L.J. 319, 337-39 (1957); Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1,

17-18 (1959).
14. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1973)
(Goldberg, J.). See also Friendly, supra n. 13, at 937-38.
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'If the government
becomes a lawbreaker,
it breeds contempt
for law.'
-Justice Louis Brandeis

merely evidence so acquired shall not be used
before the Court but that it shall not be used at
all. Of course this does not mean that the facts
thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If
knowledge of them is gained from an independent source, they may be proved like any others,
but the knowledge gained by the government's
own wrong
cannot be used by it in the way
5
proposed.'
The Olmstead case 16 involved two questions, both answered in the negative by a 5-4

majority: (1) Are telephone messages within
the protection against unreasonable search
and seizure? (2) Even if they are not, should

the evidence nevertheless be excluded because the federal agents who tapped the
phones thereby violated a state statute?

On the second issue, Chief Justice William Taft, writing for the majority, did not
challenge the Weeks rule, but insisted that
"the exclusion of evidence should be confined to cases [such as Weeks] where rights
under the Constitutionwould be violated by
admitting it."' 17 In dissent, Holmes and
Brandeis argued that "apart from the Constitution the government ought not to use evidence obtained and only obtainable by a
criminal act."' 8 Their arguments as to why

the exclusionary rule should apply to illegal,
as well as unconstitutional, police action are
essentially restatements, although more famous and most eloquent ones, of the reasoning in Weeks.
First, Holmes: 19
If [the government] pays its officers for having
got evidence by crime, I do not see why it may
not as well pay them for getting it in the same
way, and I can attach no importance to protesta15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

251 U.S. at 392.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Id. at 468.
Id. at 469-70 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 470-71 (dissenting opinion).

tions of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and
pays and announces that in the future it will pay
for the fruits. We have to choose, and for my part
I think it a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the government would play an
ignoble part.
For those who agree with me, no distinction
can be taken between the government as prosecution and the government as judge. If the existing
code does not permit district attorneys to have a
hand in such dirty business it does not permit the
judge to allow such inequities to succeed ....
I
am aware of the often repeated statement that in a
criminal proceeding the court will not take notice
of the manner in which papers offered in evidence have been obtained. But that somewhat
rudimentary mode of disposing of the question
has been overthrown by Weeks [and] the reason
for excluding evidence obtained by violating the
Constitution seems to me logically to lead to
excluding evidence obtained by a crime of the
officers of the law.
20
Then Brandeis :
When these unlawful acts were committed, they
were crimes only of the officers individually. The
government was innocent, in legal contemplation; for no federal official is authorized to commit a crime on its behalf. When the government,
having full knowledge, sought ... to avail itself
of the fruits of these acts in order to accomplish
its own ends, it assumed moral responsibility for
the officers' crimes ....
And if this court should
permit the government by means of its officers'
crimes, to effect its purpose of punishing the
defendant, there would seem to be present all the
elements of a ratification....
Will this court by sustaining the judgment
below sanction such conduct on the part of the
Executive?
... The Court's aid is denied ... in order to
maintain respect for law; in order to promote
confidence in the administration of justice; in
order to preserve the judicial process from
contamination....
Decency, security and liberty alike demand
that government officials shall be subjected to the
same rules of conduct that are commands to the
citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is
the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or
for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the government becomes
a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it
invites anarchy.

Police reaction to Mapp
I never fully appreciated the force of the
20. Id. at 483-85 (dissenting opinion).
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Weeks opinion, and the Holmes-Brandeis
dissents in Olmstead, until some 15 years
ago when an incident occurred in Minnesota
where I was then teaching. It helped me see
the implications of the rule more clearly.
Until 1961, the Minnesota courts, as well
as the courts of about half the states, had
permitted the use of unconstitutionally
seized evidence. But when the Court decided Mapp v. Ohio in 196 1,21 and imposed the
exclusionary rule on Minnesota and other
"admissibility states" as a matter of federal
constitutional law, it caused much grum-

bling in police ranks.
This led Minnesota's young attorney general, Walter Mondale, to remind the police
that "the language of the Fourth Amendment is identical to the [search and seizure
provision] of the Minnesota State Constitution" and that "Mapp did not alter one
word of either the state or national constitutions." 22 The Mapp case, stressed Mondale,
had "not reduce[d] [lawful] police powers
one iota"-"what was a reasonable search
22. Mondale, The Problem of Search and Seizure, 19
15. 16 (Feb. 1962Y. See alxn
...........
15 16 ......
192
See.....
Kamisar, Mondale
on Mapp, Feb./Mar. 1977 Civ. LIB.
REV. 62.
BENCH & B. OF MINN.
OF

21. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

MIN

I
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before, still is." 23
At a subsequent panel discussion on the
law of search and seizure in which I participated, proponents of the exclusionary rule
quoted Mondale's remarks and made explicit what those remarks implied: If the police
feared that evidence they were gathering in
the customary manner would now be excluded by the courts, the police must have
been violating the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure all along. This
evoked illuminating responses from the two
law enforcement panelists, responses which
23. Mondale, stipra n.22, at 16.

KY. L.J. 681, 697-717, 725-27 (1974). See

also, Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of
Civil Liberties Policies at the State and
Federal Levels, 5 AM. POLITICS Q. 57, 7175 (1977); D. Horowitz, THE COURTS AND
SOCIAL POLICY 220-54. Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institute, 1976; S. Wasby,
SMALL TOWN POLICE AND THE SUPREME
COURT 25-34, 81-117, 217-29. Lexington,

Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1976 (study of
southern Illinois and western Massachusetts
police); cf. Critique,69 Nw. U. L. REV. 740
(1974) a devastating criticism of the Spiotto
study, supra.
For example, Oaks and Spiotto rely on the
high frequency with which motions to suppress are granted in Chicago gambling, narcotics and weapons cases to conclude that,
long after adoption of the exclusionary rule,
illegal searches and seizures were commonplace in the enforcement of these offenses by
the Chicago police.
Canon points out that "counting successful motions is an imperfect indicator of the
rule's effectiveness for several reasons," 62
KY. L.J. at 718. He concludes that, in any
event, Chicago is "a gross exception to the
national norm of granting suppression motions," id. at 721. Canon's study of 65 cities
indicates that in 60 per cent of them motions
to suppress were granted one-tenth of the
time or less and in 91 per cent of the cities
such motions were granted one fourth of the
time or less. Id. at 722.
Moreover, comments Canon, "judges in

I think underscore the need for the "exclusionary rule" and its great symbolic value.
Minneapolis City Attorney Keith Stedd:
I don't think it [is] proper for us to [say that prior
to Mapp the police were violating the law all
along] when the courts of our state were telling
the police all along that the [exclusionary rule]
didn't apply in Minnesota.
St. Paul Detective Ken Anderson:
No officer lied upon the witness stand. If you
were asked how you got your evidence, you told
the truth. You had broken down a door or pried a
window open .. .often we picked locks .... The
Supreme Court of Minnesota sustained this time

after time after time. [The] judiciary okayed it;

Chicago have long been noted for their
willingness to grant motions to suppress
evidence" and "it is sometimes alleged that
Chicago police habitually conduct vice raids
in a manner that ensures that a motion to
suppress will be successful." Id. at 720. As
Wasby explains, supra at 108-17, 217-23,
some judges granted a substantial number of
motions to suppress "during the educational
process" immediately following adoption of
the exclusionary rule, but "police improvement and accommodation to the rules" meant
that after this transitional period few motions were granted.
To take another example (there are many
in the Canon article), Oaks' study of arrest
before and after Mapp focused on one city,
Cincinnati. He concluded that the adoption
of the exclusionary rule had had virtually no
effect on the number of arrests for narcotics,
weapons and gambling there. See 37 U.
CHI.L.REv. at 707. But Canon gathered similar data for 14 cities (including Cincinnati)
and found that only four others had the
"rather minimal response pattern that Cincinnati has." See 62 Ky. L.J. at 706.
At the other end of the spectrum, the
Baltimore decreases in arrests following
Mapp "were both dramatically sudden and
truly spectacular," id. at 704. "Baltimore is
probably an extreme case and is illustrated
to counter Oaks' generalizations about the
efficacy of the exclusionary rule from the
presentation of Cincinnati's arrest figures.
Buffalo is less extreme, but not necessarily
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24
they knew what the facts were.

"[a]s long as the Exclusionary Rule is the

There is no reason to think that the Minnesota experience is unique. The heads of
several police departments also reacted to
the adoption of the exclusionary rule as if
the guarantees against unreasonable search
and seizure had just been written.
For example, shortly after California
adopted the exclusionary rule, 25 William
Parker, then Los Angeles chief of police,
warned that his department's ability to prevent the commission of crime had been
greatly diminished because henceforth his
officers would be unable to take "affirmative
action" unless and until they possessed
"sufficient information to constitute probable cause." 26 He did promise, however, that

law of California,your police will respect it
and operate to the best of their ability within

24. Quoted in Kamisar, On the Tactics of PoliceProsecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 COR-

NELL L.Q. 436, 442-43 (1964).
25. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905
(1955).
26. W. Parker, POLICE 117. Springfield, Illinois: C. C.
Thomas, (Wilson ed. 1957).

typical. Indeed, it is not at all clear that there
is a typical response to the exclusionary
rule." Id. at 705.
Canon also noted that political scientist
Michael Ban had concluded, after an indepth study of Mapp's impact in Boston and
Cincinnati, that "the Cincinnati political
milieu ...

permitted widespread disregard

if not defiance of the Supreme Court's ruling" and that in a number of respects there
was "a discernably lesser propensity for
compliance in Cincinnati than in Boston."
Id. at 689, 698 (Canon's characterization of
Ban's findings, which, though unpublished,
have been widely circulated among political
scientists).
At the present time, there is much to be
said for lawyer-political scientist Donald
Horowitz's analysis of Mapp and police
behavior, Horowitz, supra at 224-25, 23031, 250:
Much of the empirical support for the proposition that Mapp does not deter the police from
violating the Fourth Amendment has been quite
crude ....
[T]hat illegal searches are still conducted to obtain evidence of certain kinds of
crimes does not mean that they are still conducted with the same frequency for evidence of

the framework of limitations imposed by
27

that rule."
Similarly, former New York City Police
Commissioner Michael Murphy recalled
how, when Mapp v. Ohio imposed the exclusionary rule on New York and other "admissibility states," he "was immediately
caught up in the entire problem of reevaluating our procedures ... and modifying,
amending and creating new policies and
new instructions for the implementation of
Mapp. Retraining sessions had to be held
from the very top administrators down to
each of the thousands of foot patrolmen and
detectives engaged in the daily basic en' 28
forcement function."
Commissioner Murphy, no less than
27. Id. at 131. (Emphasis added).
28. Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Methods in
Law Enforcement: The Problem of Compliance by
Police Departments,44 TEXAS L. REV. 939, 941 (1966).

other kinds of crimes. That illegal searches are
common in some cities does not mean that they
are equally common in all cities. Deterrence
cannot be viewed as 'a monolithic governmental
enterprise.'
Gradually, the rudiments of a more discriminating approach have begun to emerge. What it
suggests is that the extent to which police behavior is modified by Mapp depends on a complex
set of local conditions, including ... the type of
offense involved, the particular police unit responsible for specific enforcement tasks, and the
way in which local c6urts and lawyers handle
search-and-seizure matters. ...
... [T]he fragments indicate it is a mistake to
think that police behavior is never conditioned
by the sanction of excluding evidence that might
[Un the case of serious
lead to conviction ....
crimes the policeman starts thinking fairly early
of what is required to convict, and some of the
things he thinks of are the restrictive rules of
arrest and search.
*. . [Cloncern with conviction is very much.a
function of locale, offense, stage of investigation,
and sometimes police unit involved. Receptivity
to the judicial sanction varies accordingly.
In closing these brief remarks, I cannot
resist pointing out that at the same time
some critics of the exclusionary rule are
urging its elimination or substantial modifi-

72 Judicature/Volume 62, Number 2/August, 1978
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Chief Parker, seemed to think that "the
framework of limitations" restraining the
police had been put there by the exclusionary rule, not the state and federal constitutional guarantees against unreasonble search
and seizure. "Flowing from the Mapp case,"
he said, "isthe issue of defining probable
cause to constitute a lawful arrest and subse29
quent search and seizure."
I. Criticisms of the rule
I think it may forcefully be argued that it is
not the exclusionary rule which is illogical
or misdirected, but much of the criticism it
has generated. As Senator Robert Wagner
pointed out in the 1938 New York State
Constitution Convention:
All the arguments [that the exclusionary rule will
handicap law enforcement] seem to me to be
properly directed not against the exclusionary
rule but against the substantive guarantee itself.
S..

It is the [law of search and seizure], not the

sanction, which imposes limits on the operation
29. Id. at 943.

cation on the ground, inter alia, that it has
had little if any effect on police behavior and
little if any impact on the amount of preMapp illegality, other critics are calling for
the rule's repeal or revision on the ground,
inter alia,that in recent years the police have
attained such a high incidenceof compliance
with Fourth Amendment requirements that
"the absolute sanctions of the Exclusionary
Rule are no longer necessary to 'police'
them." Brief of Americans for Effective Law
Enforcement (A.E.L.E.) and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (I.A.
C.P.) as Amici Curiai in Support of Petitioner at 12, California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33
(1972), discussed in Comment, 65 J.CRIM.
L. & C. 373, 383 (1974).
In their amicus brief, the A.E.L.E. and the
I.A.C.P. presented the Court with the results
of a study they had conducted of warrantless
searches and seizures (such searches and
seizures were chosen because these are the
ones "in which the officer is acting on his
own with no assistance from a magistrate or
prosecuting attorney, cases in which his
activity must stand or fall based on his own
judgment, knowledge of search and seizure

of the police. If the rule is obeyed as it should be,
and as we declare it should be, there will be no
illegally obtained evidence to be excluded by the
operation of the sanction.
It seems to me inconsistent to challenge the
exclusionary rule on the ground that it will hamper the police, while making no challenge to the
fundamental rules to which the police are required to conform. 30
Cooley said of the Fourth Amendment
110 years ago that "it is better oftentimes
that crime should go unpunished than that
the citizen should be liable to have his
premises invaded, his trunks broken up, [or]
his private books, papers, and letters exposed to prying curiosity."3 1 Why is it no
less true when the accused's premises have
been invaded or his constitutional rights
30. 1 New York Constitutional Convention, Revised
Record 560 (1938), reprinted in J. Michael and H.
Wechsler, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION
1191-92. Mineola, New York: Foundation Press, 1940.
See also Traynor, J., in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,

450, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
31. T. Cooley, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL

LIMITATIONS 306. Boston: Little, Brown, 1st ed. 1868.

restrictions, and his desire to abide by such
restrictions," Brief at 16).
According to this study, of more than 1000
cases involving warrantless searches and
seizures decided by appellate courts nationwide during the 27-month period of January, 1970 through March, 1972, 84 per cent
(1,157 of 1,371) were found to be proper-

"an extraordinarily high degree of police
professionalism." Brief at 17.

The amicus brief denies that this study
evidences any beneficial exclusionary rule
influence upon law enforcement, id. at 18,
but I doubt that many will find the denial
convincing. "[T]his excellent record of successful police compliance with the riles of
search and seizure," id., is attributed to
"police profess ionalism"-an attempt by
most police to learn "at least in a general
way the restrictions on their search and
seizure activities and a good faith desire to
comport themselves properly within such
restrictions," id. at 19. But what stimulated
the attempt by most officers to familiarize
themselves, at least in a general way, with
the law of search and seizure?

Y.K.
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otherwise violated? If the government could
not have gained a conviction had it obeyed
the Constitution, why should it be permitted
to prevail because it violated the Constitution?32 And why does it generate so much
popular hostility to disallow the government
to reap an advantage that it secured, and
might only have been able to secure, by
violating the Constitution?
No one, I think, has given a better explanation than Professor John Kaplan, one of
the sharpest critics of the rule:
From a public relations point of view, [tie exclusionary rule] is the worst possible kind of rule
because it only works at the behest of a person,
usually someone who is clearly guilty, who is
attempting to prevent the use against himself of
[But the] fact is
evidence of his own crimes ....
that any rule which actually enforced the demands of the Fourth Amendment (whatever they
may be) would prevent the conviction of those
who would be caught through evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Aiendnent. The problem with the exclusionary rule is that it works
after the fact, so that by then we know who the
criminal is, the evidence against him, and the
other circumstances of the case. If there were
some way to make the police obey, in advance,
the commands of the Fourth Amendment, we
would lose at least as many criminal convictions
as we do today, but in that case we would not
know of the evidence which the police could
discover only through a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. It is possible that the real problem
with the exclusionary rule is that it flaunts before
33
us the price we pay for the Fourth Amendment.

The 'time lag' argument
The federal exclusionary rule has been disparaged on the ground that "it was not
adopted by the United States Supreme Court
until 1914" and that despite the possibility
that "an interpretation first made 125 years
[actually 123] after a constitutional provision might nonetheless be an appropriate
one, the time lag between the adoption of
32. See Allen, Federalism and The Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 34;
Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25 COLUM. L.
REV. 11, 25 (1925). True, in a goodly number of cases
the government might still have obtained a conviction
even if it had obeyedthe Constitution, but critics of the
exclusionary rule would allow the conviction to stand
even if it could have been secured only by violating the
Constitution.
33. J. Kaplan, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 215-16. Mineola,

New York: The Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1978.

74

the fourth amendment and the first appearance of the exclusionary rule is at least some
indication that it was hardly basic to the
constitutional purpose." 34 This does not
strike me as much of an argument.
Some 160 years after the adoption of the
First Amendment, the "prevention and punishment" of "the lewd and obscene, the profane [and] the libelous" were still thought
to raise no constitutional problens. 35 Indeed, 128 years passed between the adoption of the First Amendment and the first
articulation of the "clear and present danger" test 36-what may fairly be called "the
34. Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1030-31 (1974). As Dean Griswold
has pointed out in SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A DILEMMA
OF THE SUPREME COURT 2. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1975, "except for the Boydcase [Boyd
v. U.S. 116 U.S. 616 (1886), virtually no search and
seizure cases were decided by the Supreme Court in the
first 110 years of our existence under the Constitution."
The view that illegally seized evidence should be
excluded was first laid down by way of dictim in Boyd,
which went to great lengths to assert a connection
between the Fourth Amendment and the privilege
against self-incrimination, though the case could have
been decided on the self-incrimination clause alone.
Adans v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1903), appeared, by
dictum, to repudiate the Boyd dictum. Thus the exclusionary rule was adopted in Weeks "following an
earlier and seemingly inconsistent start." Reynard,
Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A
Second Class Constitutional Right?, 25 IND.L.J. 259,
306-07 (1950). See generally Atkinson, supra n. 32, at
13-17; Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34
HARV. L.REv. 361, 366-72 (1921); Notes, 56 YALE L.J.
1076, 1077-78 n. 11 (1947); 58 YALE L.J. 144, 148-51
(1948).
Professor Kaplan also observes, 26 STAN. L.REV. at
1031, that "the exclusionary rule was'not imposed upon
the states until 1961, and then by a divided Supreme
Court." But the Supreme Court never addressed the
issue until 1949 in Wolf and that decision was also by a
divided Court (6-3). Over the years, of course, Weeks
and Mapp have caught heavy criticism but so, it should
be remembered, did Wolf, See A. Beisel, CONTROL
OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW: ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 55-59. Boston:
Boston University Press, 1955; Allen, The Wolf Case:
Search and Seizure, Federalism, and Civil Liberties,45
ILL.L.REv. 1 (1950); Frank, The United States Supreme
Court: 1948-49, 17 U.CEII.L.REv. 1, 32-34 (1950); Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State
Evidence in State and Federal Courts,43 MINN.L.REv.
1083 (1959); Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search
and Seizure, 52 Nw.U.L. REV. 65, 72-76 (1957); Reynard, supra at 306-313. See also Pollak, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter:Judgment and the FourteenthAmendment,
67 YALE L.J. 304, 320-21 & n. 105 (1957).
35. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J.).
36. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, (1919);
cf. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, (1919).
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37
start of the law of the first amendment.And, of course, the development of the important "void for vagueness" and "overbreadth" doctrines in this area-"judgemade" or "judicially-created" remedies
38
fortissimo--did not come until still later.
The time lag between the adoption of the
Fifth Amendment and the applicability of
the privilege against self-incrimination to
the proceedings in the police station as well
as those in the courtroom was 175 years.39 As
for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it
was not until 1938 4 0-fairly early in the development of constitutional-criminal procedure
but still a quarter of a century later than
Weeks--that "the right to counsel in federal
courts meant more than that a lawyer would
be perinitted to appear for the defendant if

41
the defendant could afford to hire one."'

The federal exclusionary rule has also
been disparaged as not derived from "the
explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment," but only "a matter of judicial implication." 4 2 This does not strike me as much of
a point either-not, at least, unless somebody can cite even one Supreme Court case
interpreting the Constitution which is not "a
matter of judicial implication."
The most celebrated constitutionalcriminal procedure cases of our times are
Johnson v. Zerbst43 and Gideon v. Wainwright,44 requiring appointment of counsel

in all federal and state prosecutions respectively when a defendant is unable to pay for
the services of an attorney. But one searches
37. Kalven, Ernst Freund and the First Amendment
Tradition,40 U.CHI.L.REv. 235, 236 (1973).
38. See W. Lockhart, Y. Kamisar & J. Choper, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 815-22. St. Paul, Minnesota: West,
4th ed. 1975.
39. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some
Comments on the "New"Fifth Amendment and the Old
"Voluntariness" Tes 65 MICH.L.REv. 59, 65, 77-83
(1966).
40. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
41. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV.L.REv. 1, 2 (1956).
42. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). The
point has been made more strongly. See McGarr, The
Exclusionary Rule: An Ill-Conceived and Ineffective
Remedy, 52 J.Crim.L., C.&P.S. 266, 269 (1961), in
POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 99, 103.
Chicago: Aldine, Sowle ed. 1961 (Weeks "is a piece of
pure judicial legislation").
43. Seen. 40 supra.
44. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

the language of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments in vain for any mention of
indigent defendants or the assignment or
appointment of counsel at trial-let alone at
preliminary hearings,4 5 at lineups, 46 in the

police station 47 or 49
on appeal 48 or in juvenile
court proceedings.
The right to counsel has well been called
"the most pervasive right" of an accused, 50

but all the Constitution has to say about it is
that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused

shall ..

.

have

the

Assistance

of

Counsel." 5 1 That's all. The considerable
body of constitutional law which has emerged in this important area has all been "a
52
matter of judicial implication.."

'Involuntary' confessions
And what is the source of the rule-first
applied in 1936,' 3 but shaped and reshaped
in the course of the following three decades 54-barring the use of involuntary confessions as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process? Talk about judge-made
or judicially-created rules! The Constitution has nothing to say about "confessions"
or "admissions," neither "involuntary" nor
any other kind.
It will not do to point to the constitutional
prohibition against compelling a person to
45. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
46. Compare United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967) and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)
with Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
47. Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
with Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
48. Compare Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963) with Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
49. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
50. See Schaefer, supra n. 41, at 8.
51. U.S. Const. Amend. VI.
52. By "implication," too, the courts have developed
limitations on the exclusionary rule, e.g., standing, the
attenuation of taint from illegal searches, and the use of
illegally seized evidence in grand jury proceedings or
for impeachment purposes.
These limitations are said to undermine the "'judicial
integrity" rationale of the exclusionary rule. See Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976), discussed in Israel,
CriminalProcedure, The BurgerCourt, and the Legacy
of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1410-12
(1977). The limitations also make the rule "not 'look'
like a constitutional doctrine," according to Kaplan,
supra n. 34, at 1030.
53. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
54. See Kamisar, What Is an "Involuntary" Confession 17 RUTGERs L.REv. 728 (1963).
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Bright

Defendants most
often insist that the
evidence was seized
illegally in cases involving narcotics.
Many defense attorneys routinely make
a motion to suppress
such evidence.
be "a witness against himself" in "any criminal case." 5 5 The privilege was not deemed
applicable to the states until 196456 and by
that time the U.S. Supreme Court had decided some 30 state confession cases. Moreover,
as noted earlier, even if the privilege against
self-incrimination had been deemed applicable to the states, the law pertaining to
"coerced" or "involuntary" confessions still
would have developed without it.
Until Miranda,57 the prevailing view was
that because police officers lacked legal authority to compel statements, there was no
legal obligation to answer to which a privilege could apply, and thus the privilege did
not extend to the police station. 58 As late as
1966, Chief Justice Roger Traynor pointed
out that although "the Fifth Amendment has
long been the life of the party in judicial or
legislative proceedings .... it has had no
55. U.S. Const. Amend. V.
56. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). "In extending the privilege against self-incrimination to the states
and at the same time indicating that the privilege has
been the unseen governing principle of the confession
cases, Malloy forcefully brought the Fifth Amendment
to bear on the interrogation problem," W. Schaefer,
THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY

16. Evanston: Northwest-

ern University Press, 1967. The "intertwined doctrines" (the "voluntariness standard" and the privilege
against self-incrimination), noted Justice Schaefer in a
postscript to his 1966 Rosenthal Lectures, "were fused
in Miranda." Id. at 85 n. 21.
57. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
58. See the discussion in Kamisar, supra n. 39, at 65,
77-83.

life it could call its own in the pre59
arraignment stage."
Nor is it a sufficient answer to say that
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process bars
convictions based on inherently untrustworthy evidence (long a universally accepted
view, but, incidentally, not an explicit requirement of the due process clause either).
This does not explain why the question of
the admissibility of an involuntary confession must be "answered with complete disregard of whether or not petitioner in fact
spoke the truth" 60 and why "a legal standard
which took into account the circumstance of
probable truth or falsity ... is not a permissible standard under the Due Process
Clause." 61 It does not explain why involuntary confessions "are inadmissible under the
Due Process Clause even though statements
contained in them may be independently
62
established as true."
Nor does it explain the "rule of automatic
reversal"--the rule formulated by the Stone
and Vinson Courts and reaffirmed by the
Warren Court that the introduction of an
59. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal
Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U.CHI.L.REv. 657,
669 (1966).
60. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961).
61. Id. at 543.
62. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)
(relying in large part on rationale of coerced confession
cases to exclude evidence produced by "stomach
pumping").
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involuntary statement at the trial necessitates reversal, regardless of how much un-

the admission of unconstitutionally seized
"real" evidence from that of involuntary

tainted evidence remains to support the conviction .63

confessions. For "[in both situations the

Are confessions different?
Critics of the search and seizure exclusionary rule try to distinguish away the coerced
confession cases, 64 and for good reason. For
once it becomes clear that the rationale of
the coerced confession cases "has been expanded beyond protect[ing] the individual
from conviction on unreliable or untrustworthy evidence" to "strik[ing] down police
procedures which in their general application appear to the prevailing justices as
6
imperiling basic individual immunities,- 5
as Professor Francis Allen pointed out a
quarter of a century ago, then it becomes
most difficult to distinguish the problem of
63. See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 597 n.1
(1944); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,404 (1945);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948); Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952); Payne v. Arkansas
356 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1958); Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315, 324 (1959); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568, 621 (1961); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503,
518-19 (1963).
Apparently the "rule of automatic reversal" still applies to "coerced" or "involuntary" confessions, see
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8 (1967),
but not to Massiah (Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964) or Miranda violations. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972); United States v. Sanchez,
422 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Jackson,
429 F.2d 1368 (7th Cir. 1970) (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also,

Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of
Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U.CHIL.
REV. 317, 348 (1954).
64. Thus, in criticizing the exclusionary rule as to
unconstitutionally seized materials, Professor Charles
Alan Wright notes, Wright, Must the CriminalGo Free
if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEXAS L.REv 736, 737
(1972): "[W]e are talking only of what lawyers call 'real'
evidence. Involuntary confessions and other evidence
of that kind raise entirely different questions. Innocent
men may give false confessions if sufficient pressure is
put upon them by the police. The murder weapon, the
envelope of narcotics, the gambling slips, however,
speak for themselves." (Don't murder weapons and
narcotics obtained as a result of involuntary confessions "speak for themselves" too?).

See also Wilkey, Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 13
THE PROSECUTOR 124 (1977): "In exclusionary rule

cases involving material evidence there is never any
question of reliability. Reliability is in question, for
example, with a coerced confession .... Exclusion of
evidence is then proper, because the evidence is inherently unreliable."

65. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL.L.REv. 1, 29

(1950).

perils arise primarily out of the procedures
employed to acquire the evidence rather
than from dangers of the incompetence of
the evidence so acquired." 66
Although those unhappy with the exclusionary rule still make the claim that the
admissibility of uficonstitutionally seized
"real" evidence and "involuntary" confes67
sions "raise entirely different questions,"
thd argument comes about 30 years too
late. 68
It is interesting to note that at one point

Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court
in the famous Spano case reads like a restatement of the reasoning in Weeks and the

Holmes-Brandeis dissents in Olmstead:
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone on their
inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the
deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the
law while enforcing the law; that in the end life
and liberty can be as much endangered from
illegal methods used to convict those thought to
be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.6 9

66. Id.
67. See n. 64 supra.
68. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), and
companion cases, reversing convictions based on
"involuntary" confessions despite dissenting Justice
Jackson's undisputed assertions that "[c]hecked with
external evidence, [the confessions in each case] are
inherently believable, and were not shaken as to the
truth by anything that occurred at the trial." 338 U.S.
57, 58.
See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-173
(1952): "It has long ceased to be true that due process of
law is heedless of the means by which otherwise
relevant and credible evidence is obtained. This was
not true even before the series of recent cases enforced
the constitutional principle that the states may *notbase
convictions upon confessions, however much verified,
obtained by coercion ....
To attempt in this case to
distinguish what lawyers call 'real evidence' from verbal evidence is to ignore the reasons for excluding
coerced confessions."
See generally A. Beisel, CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT 70-86. Boston: Boston University

Press, 1955; Allen, supra n. 65, at 26-29; Allen, Due

Process and.State Criminal Procedures:Another Look,
48 Nw.U.L.REv. 16, 20-25 (1953); Meltzer, supran.63,
at 326-29, 343, 347-49; Paulsen, The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN.L.REv. 411,
417-23 (1954).
69. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,320-21 (1959).
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One of Justice Frankfurter's last opinions
on the subject-and I confess that I find it
rather mystifying that the author of Wolf
would write this in the same term he dissented in Mapp-perhaps best suggests the
close affinity between the Weeks rule and
the coerced confession rationale. Speaking
for a 7-2 majority, in Rogers v. Richmond,
Frankfurter observed:
Our decisions under [the Fourteenth] Amendment have made clear that convictions following
the admission into evidence of confessions which
are involuntary ...cannot stand. This is so not
because such confessions are unlikely to be true
but because the methods used to extract them
offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system....
To be sure, confessions cruelly extorted may be
and have been, to an unascertained extent, found
to be untrustworthy. But the constitutional principle of excluding confessions that are not voluntary does not rest on this consideration. Indeed,
in many of the cases in which the command of
the Due Process Clause has compelled us to
reverse state convictions involving the use of
confessions obtained by impermissible methods,
independent corroborating evidence left little
doubt of the truth of what the defendant had
confessed....
Since a defendant had been subjected to pressures to which, under our accusatorial system, an
accused should not be subjected, we were constrained to find that the procedures leading to his
conviction had failed to afford him that due
process of law which the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees .70
If a conviction rests in part on an independently corroborated and concededly truthful
confession (albeit one found to be the product of constitutionally impermissible methods), why cannot the conviction stand? Why
not remand those who have made such confessions, together with those who managed
to remain silent in the face of impermissible
interrogations, "to the remedies of private
action and such protection as the internal
discipline of the police, under the eyes of an
alert public opinion, may afford"? 7' Though
the exclusion of involuntary but verified
confessions may be an effective way of deterring objectionable interrogation methods,
why must the court "condemn as falling
below the minimal standards assured by the
70. 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
71. Cf.Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949).
78

Due Process Clause a State's reliance upon
other methods [to deter such conduct]
which, if consistently enforced, would be
72
equally effective"?
Moreover, if the impermissible police
methods which produce involuntary confessions are typically more offensive to the
dignity of the individual and more often
characterized by violence than are unconstitutional searches and seizures, are not these
objectionable interrogation methods more
likely to attract the interest of the press,
more likely to arouse community opinion,
more likely to excite the sympathy of jurors?
Why, then, is the court unwilling to rely on
tort actions, criminal prosecutions and internal police discipline to check impermissible
police interrogation practices? Why does the
"command" of the Due Process Clause
"compel" the court to reverse the convic74
tion? 73 Why can't the conviction stand?
The reason is that to uphold a conviction
resting in part on an involuntary confession,
however much verified, would be to "sanction" the objectionable methods which produced it and to afford these methods "the
cloak of law,"' 75 the very insight which the
Weeks Court and Holmes and Brandeis expressed long ago.

It. The role of the Court
It is not surprising that a majority of the
Court would conclude in 1949, as it did in
Wolf v. Colorado,76 that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not prevent a state court
from admitting evidence obtained by an
72. Cf. Wolf v. Colorado, supra n. 71.

73. Cf. Rogers v. Richmond, quoted in text at n. 70
supra.
74. Id. See also McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.

332, 339 (1943), where, before putting aside constitutional issues and invoking its supervisory powers over
federal criminal justice, the Court noted, per Frankfurter, J.: "It is true, as the petitioners assert, that a
conviction in the federal courts, the foundation of
which is evidence obtained in disregard of liberties
deemed fundamental by the Constitution, cannot stand.
Boyd v. United States: Weeks v. United States .. "
75. Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173-74
(1952): "Coerced confessions offend the community's
sense of fair play and decency. So here, to sanction [the
'stomach pumping' which produced the morphine
capsules] . . . would be to afford brutality the cloak of

law. Nothing would be more calculated to discredit law
and thereby brutalize the temper of a society.
76. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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unreasonable search and seizure, and that
Justice Frankfurter would write the opinion
of the Court. Frankfurter's, and his breth-

ren's, "notions of the obligations of federalism were a strongly limiting influence on
[their] role in the criminal cases during the
years before the Warren tenure." 77 The Wolf
case "provided an important demonstration

of the Court's essential fidelity to the assumptions of a federal system at a time when
[the Court] was being subjected to extreme
and irresponsible charges of usurpation of
78

power.."

Nevertheless, one is, or ought to be, taken
aback by Frankfurter's reasoning in Wolf:
The protection against unreasonable search
and seizure is "basic to a free society," is
"enforceable against the States through the
Due Process Clause," but a conviction resting on evidence obtained in disregard of this
fundamental and constitutionally protected
right can stand-that, if I may be permitted
to quote what I said about the Wolf case 19
years ago, "this is an instance where one
may be ... imprisoned

on evidence

ob-

tained in violation of due process and yet
not be deprived of life or liberty without due
79
process of law after all.."
Frankfurter, no less than Justice Day in
Weeks, has assumed elsewhere that permitting evidence obtained in violation of a law
to be made the basis of a conviction would
"stultify the policy" manifested by the law.8 0
77. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The
Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U.ILL.L.F.
518, 526.
78. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A
Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SuP. CT.

REV.

1, 5.

79. Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43
MINN.L.REV. 1083, 1108 (1959).
A decade later, Justice Frankfurter protested that
Wolf did not mean that the substantive scope of the
Fourth Amendment as such applies to the states via
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, that Wolf did not
mean that every search and seizure violative of the
Fourth Amendment would make the same conduct on
the part of the state officials a violation of the Fourteenth. See his dissent in Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 233, 237-40 (1960).
But most members of the Court did read Wolf this
way. See Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court in
Elkins, 364 U.S. at 212-215; and Justice Clark's opinion
for the Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-51,
654-56 (1961). For reasons spelled out in Kamisar,
supra at 1101-08, I think the Mapp and Elkins Courts

properly read Wolf as equating the substantive scope of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

And perhaps no jurist since Holmes and
Brandeis has balked as much as Frankfurter
at the courts becoming "accomplices" in
police lawlessness by sustaining a conviction resting on evidence obtained by violation of law. The cases discussed above involving "involuntary" confessions which
bear the stamp of verity illustrate this point,
at least implicity.
But Frankfurter hfs been more explicit. In
the famous McNabb case, he observed for a
7-1 majority:
A statute [providing that arrestees promptly be
taken before the nearest judicial officer] is expressive of a general legislative policy to which courts
should not be heedless when appropriate situations call for its application.
*. *Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence
secured through such a flagrant disregard of the
procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without making the
courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law. Congress has not explicitly forbidden the use of evidence so procured [no more
than did the draftsmen of the Fourth Amendment]. But to permit such evidence to be made
the basis of a conviction in the federal courts
would stultify the policy which Congress has
enacted into law.
... We are not concerned with law enforce-

ment practices except in so far as courts themselves become instruments of law enforcement.
We hold only that a decent regard for the duty of
courts as agencies of justice and custodians of
liberty forbids that men should be convicted
upon evidence secured under the circumstances
revealed here. In so doing, we respect the policy
which underlies Congressional legislation. 8'

Court inconsistencies
It will not do to dismiss McNabb as an
instance of the Court's exercise of its supervisory powers over federal criminal justice.
Either courts which permit illegally obtained evidence to be used or allow convictions resting on such evidence to stand "become instruments" of such law enforcement
or they do not. Either the courts' duty "as
agencies of justice and custodians of liberty" forbids that persons should be convicted
upon evidence secured in violation of law or
it does not.
If a federal court cannot allow a convic80. See McNabb v. United States, quoted in text at n.
81 infra.
81. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344-47
(1943).
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tion resting on a federal statutoryviolation
to stand without making itself an "accomplice" in the police lawlessness, then how
can any court allow a conviction resting on a
federal constitutional violation to stand? If
permitting the use of evidence secured in
disregard of statutory law -would "stultify
the policy which Congress has enacted into
law," then how can it be maintained that
permitting the use of evidence obtained by
violating the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments does not "stultify the policy"
which the Constitution has enacted into
law?
Nor, as I see it, can the reasoning of the
court, by Frankfurter, in Wolf, be squared
with its reasoning, by Frankfurter, in Rochin8 2 -or
with Frankfurter's dissent in
83
Irvine.
In striking down a conviction resting on
evidence produced by "stomach pumping"
-and certainly the morphine capsules taken
from Rochin's stomach were no less trustworthy than the materials seized from
Wolf's office-the Rochin Court, through
Frankfurter, reminded us that "due process
of law" means at least that "convictions
cannot be brought about by methods that
offend 'a sense of justice.' '' 84 But don't all
convictions brought about by methods that
offend due process offend "a sense of justice"?
California did not "affirmatively sanction" the police misconduct in Rochin anymore than did Colorado in Wolf. The "stomach pumping," no doubt, was a tort and a
crime. Moreover, as the Rochin Court pointed out, the brutal conduct "naturally enough
was condemned by the court whose judgment is before us." 85 Why, then, would
82. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
83. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 142 (1954).
The Court affirmed Irvine's conviction for horse-race
bookmaking and related offenses though based on in-

criminating conversations heard through a concealed
microphone illegally installed in petitioner's home.

Justice Jackson wrote the four-man plurality opinion.
Justice Clark concurred in the result, noting that if he
had been on the Court when Wolf was decided, he
would have applied the federal exclusionary rule to the
states. 347 U.S. at 138. Justice Black, joined by Douglas,
J., and Justice Frankfurter, joined by Burton, J., filed
separate dissents.
84. 342 U.S. at 173.

85. Id.

sustaining the conviction amount to "sanctioning" the police misconduct and "affording" it "the cloak of law"? And if it would,
why would it not in Wolf?
Nor did the Irvine Court "affirmatively
sanction" the repeated illegal entries into
petitioner's home. Justice Jackson, who
wrote the principal opinion in this case, took
pains to note that "there is no lack of remedy
if an unconstitutional wrong has been done
in this instance without upsetting a justifiable conviction of this common gambler."8 6
Indeed, Jackson went so far as to direct the
clerk of court "to forward a copy of the
record in this case, together with a copy of
this opinion, for attention of the Attorney
87
General of the United States.."
Why, then, did Frankfurter dissent in Irvine? Why did he protest that the Court
cannot
. . dispose of this case by satisfying ourselves
that the defendant's guilt was proven by trustworthy evidence and then finding, or devising
other means whereby the police may be discouraged from using illegal methods to acquire such
evidence.
* . . If, as in Rochin, '[oin the facts of this case
the conviction of the petitioner has been obtained
by methods that offend the Due Process Clause'
[wasn't this true of Wolf?], it is no answer to say
that the offending policemen and prosecutors
who utilize outrageous methods should be punished for their misconduct.
That the prosecution in this case, with the
sanction of the courts, flouted a legislatively
declared philosophy against such miscreant conduct and made it a policy merely on paper, does
not make the conduct any the less a disregard of
due process.
Of course it is a loss to the community when a
conviction is overturned because the indefensible means by which it was obtained cannot be
squared with the commands of due process....
But ... [a] sturdy, self-respecting democratic
*

86. 347 U.S. at 137.
87. Id. at 138. Only Chief Justice Warren joined
Justice Jackson in this regard. The chief justice was

"new on the job"; indeed, his nomination had not yet

been confirmed. In later years he was to recognize that
the admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence
"has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct
which produced the evidence." See text at n. 106 infra.
Incidentally, nothing came of the federal investigation suggested by Justice Jackson, in large part because
the transgressing officers were acting under orders of
the chief of police and with the full knowledge of the
local prosecutor. See Comment, 7 STAN. L.REv. 76, 94
n.75 (1954).
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community should not put up with lawless police
and prosecutors.

88

Reconciling the differences
I can think of only three possible ways to
reconcile Wolf with the majority opinion in
Rochin, the dissents in Irvine and the rationale of the involuntary confession cases.
None of them is satisfactory:
1. Not all violations of the Fourth Amendment offend due process; only certain "outrageous" or "aggravated" types of unreasonable searches and seizures do so.
Although even before Mapp v. Ohio and
8 9 I argued at considerable
Ker v. California
length to the contrary, 90 the Wolf opinion
could conceivably have stood for, or have
come to stand for, this limited proposition.9"
But today it is plain that it does not. Although some justices have balked at "incorporating" a specific provision of the Bill of
Rights into the Fourteenth "jot-for-jot" and
"bag and baggage," especially in the jury
trial cases, it is now clear that the Court did
not apply a "watered-down" version of the
Fourth Amendment to the states, but rather
one which applies to the same extent it has
been interpreted to apply to the federal
92
government.
2. Evidence, verbal or real, which is the
product of police violence or brutality
should be excluded, but not evidence
which is obtained by other types of police
misconduct.
This is the distinction that Justice Jackson
drew in Irvine-and one which he sought to
93
make even among involuntary confessions.
But the court has long recognized that involuntariness or coercion need not be based
88. 347 U.S. at 148-149 & n.1 (Emphasis added).
89. 374 U.S. 23 (1963) ("standard of reasonableness
is the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments"). See also Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)
(reading Ker as holding that standard for obtaining a
search warrant is the same).

90. Seen. 79 supra.
91. Id.

92. See generally, Y. Kamisar, J. Grano & J. Haddad,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 12-15. Los Angeles: Center for
Creative Educational Services, 1977; W. Lockhart, Y.
Kamisar & J. Choper, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 577-84.

St. Paul: West, 4th ed. 1975.

93. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1949) (concurring
opinion). See also the comments on Justice Jackson's

views in Paulsen, supra n. 68, at 428.

upon physical violence or the threat of it. 94
Why, then, should such violence or the
threat of it be a prerequisite for excluding
other unconstitutionally seized evidence?
Moreover, today virtually everybody
would reject a rule, as did Frankfurter and
the other Irvine dissenters, whether it be a
rule for "real" evidence or for verbal, that
"even the most reprehensible means for securing a conviction will not taint a verdict so
long as the body of the accused was not
95
touched by State officials."
3. Obtainingevidence by searches or seizures that would have violated the Fourth
Amendment if conducted by federal officers does violate Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process when made by state officers.
But the use of such evidence in state courts
does not offend due process unless the
police methods involved constitute an "aggravated" or "outrageous" or "shocking"
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
This, it seems to me, is the doctrine which
emerges from Frankfurter's majority opinions in Wolf and Rochin and his dissent in
Irvine. I find it a difficult proposition-a
most curious one. Only one step is needed
for "involuntary" confessions-the use of
any confession obtained in violation of due
process offends due process. But two steps
are required for unreasonable searches and
seizures: (1) Did the police violate the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? (2) If
so, by how much? Was it a "gross" violation
or only "mild"? "Flagrant" or "routine"?
The degree of violation
Where does this "two-plimsoll mark due
process" test come from? 96 Talk about judicially created rules of evidence! Where is
94. Thus, the Court threw out the confession in Fikes
v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957), although "concededly,
there was no brutality or physical coercion" and "psychological coercion is by no means manifest." Id. at 200
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Leyra v. Denno, 347
U.S. 556 (1954); Spano v. New York 360 U.S. 315
(1959).
95. 374 U.S. at 146.
96. Cf. Frankfurter, J., concurring in Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 199 (1957): "I cannot escape the
conclusion . . . that in combination [these circumstances] bring the result below the Plimsoll line of 'due
process.
See Field, Frankerfurter,J., Concurring, 71 HARv.L.
REV. 77 (1957); Kamisar, supra n. 79, at 1121-29.
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this written or even implied in the Constitution? Next to this test, surely, the Weeks
Court's reading of the Fourth Amendment
and the Mapp Court's reading of the Fourth
and Fourteenth seem like pretty straightforward interpretations of the Constitution.
To say that police conduct is unconstitutional, that it violates the minimal standards
of due process, is as bad a label as one can
put on police misconduct. How then can it
be said that still more is required for exclusion? Why then must the police be found to
have violated sub-minimal standards?
How does one "barely" or "mildly" violate what is "basic to a free society" or
' ' 97
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty ?
If police action which violates due process
is not gross or aggravated police misconduct
per se, then why is it a violation of due
process?
My purpose in comparing the reasoning in
Wolf with that in McNabb, Rochin and other
cases, and with what might be called the
"imperative of judicial integrity" consideration in the confession area, 98 is not to
demonstrate that the Court, or Frankfurter in
particular, has been inconsistent. That is to
be expected; indeed, it is almost inevitable.
After all, Justice Frankfurter sat on the Supreme Court for more than 20 years and few
judges who have served half as long have
not been inconsistent.
My purpose rather is to provide "education in the obvious": 99 Almost no sensitive
judge can take seriously the implications of
Wolf. Almost no sensitive judge can live
with those implications. At some point he
will not care about or even think about
"alternatives" to the remedy of exclusionhe will exclude the evidence however logically relevant and verifiable it be or, if the
court below admitted it, he simply will not
let the conviction stand. At some point he
will be unable to do otherwise.
When that point is reached, he will do
what a majority did in Rochin and some
would have done in Irvine-he will refuse
97. See Allen, supra n. 78, at 9. See also Kamisar,
supra n. 79, at 1121-24.
98. Cf.Elkins v. United States, supra n. 7.
99. Holmes, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 291, 292. New York: Harcourt, 1920.
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"to have a hand in such dirty business. '0 0
This is why the Weeks Court's interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment, Wigmore's famous criticism to the contrary notwithstanding '0 1, is, if not perfectly logical, quite
understandable-even quite natural.
The Weeks Court believed this point was
reached when the police violated the Fourth
Amendment; the Rochin Court and the Irvine dissenters believed that it was reached
when the police violated some sub-minimal
standard. But the response was the same: We
don't care about possible tort actions or
other possible "alternative remedies"! The
government obtained the conviction by "indefensible means." 10 2 We the judges cannot
sanction this. We the judges cannot afford it
"the cloak of law."' 10 3

A judge's threshold
To say that most judges have what might be
called a threshold for excluding trustworthy
evidence is not to deny that the threshold
varies considerably among them-or even
that over the years it may shift significantly
in the mind or heart of an individual judge.
In his decade and a half as Chief Justice
of the United States, for example, Earl Warren's threshold for exclusion lowered quite a
bit. In his first year on the Court, he joined
in Justice Jackson's principal opinion in
Irvine, upholding a conviction based on
"incredible" police misconduct but assuring
us that "admission of the evidence does not
exonerate the officers . . . if they have violat100. Holmes, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928). As I read Holmes'
dissent, he did not, as many seem to think, regard
wiretapping as inherently "ignoble" or "immoral," but
only wiretapping-or for that matter, any other means
of obtaining evidence by the government-which constituted a specific violation of the law. This was the
"dirty business."
101. See8 J. Wigmore, EVIDENCE §2184 at 35,40 (3d
ed. 1940).
102. See text at n. 88 supra. Are not all unconstitutional means of obtaining evidence to secure a conviction "indefensible"? And if not, why are they unconstitutional?
103. See text at n. 88 supra. If alternative means of
punishing or discouraging governmental lawlessness
are available (at least theoretically), as they were in
Rochin and Irvine, why does admitting the evidence
constitute "put[ting] up with lawless police and prosecutors"? And if it does, why did the Court put up with
the governmental lawlessness in Wolf?
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ed defendant's constitutional rights" 1 0 4
"there is no lack of remedy if an unconstitutional wrong has been done in this instance
10 5
without upsetting [the] conviction."'
Seven years later, however, the Chief Justice joined in the opinion for the Court in
Mapp. And another seven years later, very
close to the end of his career, he observed for
the Court in the "stop and frisk" cases:
Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot
and will not be made party to lawless invasions of
the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting
unhindered governmental use of the fruits of
such invasions. Thus in our system evidentiary
rulings provide the context in which the judicial
process of inclusion and exclusion approves
some conduct as comporting with constitutional
guarantees and disapproves other actions by state
agents. A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal
trial, we recognize, has the necessary effect of
legitimizing the conduct which produced the
evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur.
...When [unconstitutional] conduct is identifled, it must be condemned by the judiciary and
its fruits must0 6be
excluded from evidence in
s
criminal trials.
Holmes and Brandeis seem to have had a
consistently low threshold for exclusion. In
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process cases
at least, Justice Jackson appears to have had
a consistently high one. For him unconstitutional police conduct was not enough, not
even serious or aggravated unconstitutional
conduct. It had to involve physical violence
or brutality as well.
That a judge is more likely to give short
shrift to alternatives to the remedy of exclusion in a shocking case of police misconduct
than in a routine one is hardly surprising.
But is it logical? If police misconduct is ever
going to attract the interest of the press,
arouse community opinion and excite the
sympathy of jurors, it is going to do so in the
senational or shocking case (such as Rochin
and Irvine)-not the "routine" or "mild"
unconstitutional search and seizure case
(such as Wolf).
This is why-although his reasoning must
seem curious to many of us who have grown
up with Wolf, Rochin and Irvine-a leading
104. 347 U.S. at 137.
105. Id.
106. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13, 15 (1968).

proponent of the exclusionary rule maintained, some 50 years ago, that infringements of the Fourth Amendment which generate the least public outcry pose the strongest case for exclusion. 10 7 "The more violent
and obvious infringement," he was willing
to concede, "may be curtailed through civil
or criminal actions against the guilty officers."lO8
It would be hard to deny that a court's
refusal to permit the use of evidence obtained by "obvious" or "shocking" police
misconduct is, at least in some measure,
symbolic. It signifies to the police officer and
to the general public alike the court's Linwillingness to tolerate the underlying police
lawlessness. But if this is true in a case
where the alternative remedies of tort actions, criminal prosecutions and internal
discipline are most likely to be effective,
how can it be any less so when the court
allows the evidence to be used in a not-soshocking case of unconstitutional police
conduct-and thus one where alternatives to
the remedy of exclusion are unlikely, or at
least less likely, to amount to anything?
11L Drawing the 'bottom line'
A court which admits the evidence in such a
case manifests a willingness to tolerate the
unconstitutional conduct which produced
it. How can the police and the citizenry be
expected "to believe that the government
truly meant to forbid the conduct in the first
place"? 0 9 Why should the police or the
public accept the argument that the availability of alternative remedies permits the
court to admit the evidence without sanctioning the underlying misconduct when the
greater possibility of alternative remedies in
the "flagrant" or "willful" case doi~s not
allow the court to do so?
A court which admits the evidence in a
case involving a "run of the mill" Fourth
Amendment violation demonstrates an in107. Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained
Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25
COLUM. L.REv. 11, 24 (1925).

108. Id.
109. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 255, 258
(1961), in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
87, 90. Chicago: Aldine, Sowle ed. 1962.
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sufficient commitment to the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure. It
demonstrates "the contrast between morality professed by society and immorality practiced on its behalf." 110 It signifies that government officials need not always "be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizens.""'
Where should the threshold for exclusion
be put? At what point should a judge say
that the police misconduct is so indefensible
or offensive as to warrant throwing out the
evidence it produced? To say that this point
is not reached until the police have resorted
to violence or brutality or that it is not
reached unless they have perpetrated some
"gross" or "serious" or "aggravated" violation of the Constitution seems neither a
principled nor a manageable way to go
about it.
If the line must be drawn somewhere, I
110. Frankfurter, J., dissenting in On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747, 759 (1952).
111. Brandeis, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, 485 (1928).
112. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976)
(White, J., dissenting)(evidence should not be excluded
when seized by an officer "acting in the good-faith
belief that his conduct comported with existing law and
having reasonable grounds for this [good-faith] belief"); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring in part) (distinguishing between
"flagrantly abusive" Fourth Amendment violations and
"technical" or "good faith" violations);
Also, Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 418 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting) ("inadvertent" or "honest mistakes" by police
should not be treated in the same way as "deliberate
and flagrant Irvine-type violations of the Fourth
Amendment"); United States v. Soyka, 394 F.2d 443,
451-52 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (officer's
error "so minuscule and pardonable" as to render
exclusion of evidence inappropriate).
See also A Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § SS 290.2 (Official Draft, 1975) (evidence shall be
excluded only if violation upon which it was based was
"substantial"; all violations shall be deemed substantial if "gross, wilful and prejudicial to accused"; otherwise court shall consider, inter alia, "the extent of
deviation from lawful conduct" and "the extent to
which the violation was wilful"); E. Griswold, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME COURT 58

(1975) (officer should be supported if he "acted decently" and "did what you would expect a good, careful,
conscientious police officer to do under the circumstances").
If the officer, as Dean Griswold described it, acted in
the manner that "a good, careful, conscientious police
officer" is expected to act, or if, as Judge Friendly
maintained in Soyka, supra, the officer's error was "so
minuscule and pardonable as to render the drastic
sanction of exclusion ...almost grotesquely inappro-

84

can think of no more logical and fitting place
to draw it than at unconstitutional police
conduct, however "mild," "honest" or "inadvertant" some may label it.

112

Frankfurter

argued that the Court should reverse in
Irvine, although it affirmed the conviction in
Wolf, because the Irvine police misconduct
was more shocking and offensive. But Jackson responded: "Actually, the search [in
Wolf] was offensive to the law in the same
' 3
respect, if not the same degree, as here.""
I think Jackson was right (but for the
wrong reason). Once the Court identifies the
police action as unconstitutional, that ought
to be the end of the matter. There should be
no "degrees" of "offensiveness" among different varieties of unconstitutional police
conduct. A violation of the Constitution
ought to be the "bottom line." This is where
the Weeks and Mapp Courts drew the line.
This is where it ought to stay.
El
priate," then the error should not render the search
or seizure "unreasonable" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment-as the Second Circuit held on
rehearing en banc in Soyka, 394 F.2d 452. After all,
probably cause is supposed to turn on "the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act,"
Brinegar v. United States,338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); and
affidavits are supposed to be interpreted in a "commonsense" rather than a "hypertechnical" manner, United
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965).
In light of existing law, the proposals or suggestions
to modify the exclusionary rule must mean that the
challenged evidence should be admissible even when
the officer acted unreasonably, i.e., negligently, so long
as his misconduct was not deliberate or reckless, but
"inadvertent." On this issue (although I disagree with
him on a number of other points) I share Professor
Kaplan's concern:
0 Such a modification of the rule "would put a premium
on the ignorance of the police officer and, more significantly, on the department which trains him," Kaplan,
supra n. 34 at 1044;
* "Would add one more factfinding operation, and an
especially difficult one to administer, to those already
required of a lower judiciary which, to be frank, has
hardly been very trustworthy in this area," id. at 1045;
*So long as so many trial judges remain hostile to the
exclusionary rule, "the addition of another especially
subjective factual determination will constitute almost
an open invitation to nullification at the trial court
level," id.

See also Proceedings of 48th Annual Meeting of ALl
374-98 (1971) (debate on Model Pre-Arraignment Code
proposal, supra, to exclude illegally obtained evidence
only when underlying violation was "substantial").
113. 347 U.S. at 133.
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